This is the second of three articles in a series revealing secret financial and credit practices that affect us all.
"Cross-selling" or selling new products to existing customers has been called "the core of modern-day banking[.]" Wells Fargo in particular led the way in cross-selling "mortgages, credit cards and auto loans," thereby saving all the costs of acquiring new customers which would have to be incurred before the bank would even have the opportunity to sell them additional products.[1]
A reporter, E. Scott Reckard, broke the story of what went wrong when he reported in a newspaper article that in order to meet their sales quotas, Wells Fargo employees opened accounts and ordered credit cards for customers that the customers did not request, did not need, and did not even know about.[2]
Mr. Reckard's reporting was based, as he himself wrote, on reviewing "internal bank documents and court records" and interviewing "28 former and seven current Wells Fargo employees who worked at bank branches in nine states, including California." Even a casual reader would also have taken note that the article mentioned at least 10 lawsuits against Wells Fargo as a result of the "cross-selling" quotas Wells imposed on its employees and inflicted on its customers.[3]
The complaint filed by the City Attorney's Office against Wells Fargo in May, 2015 alleged essentially the same things that were reported in the newspaper a year-and-a-half before.[4]
Administrative actions opened by two federal agencies, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ("CFPB") and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC"), were similarly based on what was reported in the newspapers.[5]
Both of these federal agencies opened their administrative actions with "Consent Orders" in which they announced their respective settlements with Wells Fargo.[6]
In the settlements in September 2016, Wells Fargo only put numbers on "unauthorized deposit accounts" and "unauthorized credit cards," however. According to Wells Fargo in late 2016, 1,534,280 deposit accounts were opened at Wells Fargo in the names of Wells customers that had not authorized them, between May, 2011 and July, 2015. The Wells Fargo customers had no idea that this was happening. It was all done in secret.
Continuing to put numbers on some of these practices, Wells Fargo also told the regulators in September 2016 that "roughly 85,000 of those accounts incurred about $2 million in fees, which [Wells Fargo] is in the process of refunding."[7]
Wells Fargo was to say later that even more of its customers may have been affected. Wells wrote later that its internal investigation and reform of cross-selling practices "could lead to, among other things, an increase in the identified number of potentially impacted customers."[8]
Second, Wells Fargo also informed the regulators that there were 565,443 credit card applications supposedly made by Wells Fargo customers. Wells's customers did not actually authorize those credit card applications. At the time the credit card applications were made, hardly any of Wells's customers knew what was going on.
Later, after the settlements of September 2016 with the regulators were all final, Wells announced that it had found another possibly 1 million to 1.5 million more fake accounts, for a total of approximately 3.5 million sham accounts, "a nearly 70 percent increase over the bank's initial estimate" which it had previously stated to the government agencies before it settled with them.[9]
In September 2016, Wells Fargo agreed with the three government regulators -- the L.A. City Attorney's Office, the CFPB and the OCC -- to pay a total of $185 million in fines and penalties. As one person described it: "Wells is paying what amounts to a couple of parking tickets for each of the 1.5 million accounts."[10]
In a somewhat unusual twist, the information available to the public about Wells Fargo's conduct in this matter was essentially what was reported in the newspapers in the first place. Wells Fargo did not admit to any wrongdoing in any of its settlements. Wells Fargo did not admit to any wrongdoing in its settlement with the Los Angeles City Attorney,[11] or with the CFPB,[12] or with the OCC.[13]
The allegations that the government regulators made against Wells Fargo tell nothing apart from what was already in the newspapers. The unusual fact of these settlements is that the alleged perpetrator admitted anything.
However, the City Attorney's Office, at least, had more evidence against Wells Fargo. Presumably, the City Attorney's Office would have been willing to extend professional courtesy to the CFPB and OCC and share the evidence. That would have given evidence against Wells Fargo to two federal agencies investigating Wells Fargo in this matter as well as the City Attorney.
We do not know for certain whether the City Attorney shared the evidence. Nor do we know what the evidence was. It was kept secret. The City Attorney agreed with Wells Fargo to keep the evidence secret. The City Attorney and Wells Fargo further agreed to ask a judge to approve their secrecy agreement.[14]
The court's electronic docket is a record of everything that was filed in the case. These events are all listed on that record, such as Wells Fargo's motion to keep its interrogatory responses (written questions with written answers) a secret in June, 2016. On the other hand, none of the actual materials is publicly available from the court. The author has sent EMails to the City Attorney's Office requesting copies. As of the date of this publication, the author has received copies of two Stipulations and two Protective Orders approving them in the case. One of the orders was entered on February 2, 2016,[15] and the other order was entered on June 14, 2016.[16] Wells Fargo and the City wrote some of their own rules of procedure especially for themselves particularly on the subject of keeping evidence secret in this case.
It is reasonably certain that Wells Fargo was served with written questions to which it would ordinarily be required to respond. In the Los Angeles City Attorney's case, the questions came in special interrogatories.
No-one outside of the City Attorney's Office and Wells Fargo, perhaps, knows much about what was in the special questions that the City Attorney served on Wells Fargo in this case. The City Attorney's special interrogatories must have been very "special." These questions were specially crafted by the City Attorney's Office to serve on Wells Fargo in this particular case.
Both sides agreed on keeping much of the evidence a secret. Both sides presented the proposed order to the judge. Both sides asked the judge to sign it.
The City Attorney's Office and Wells Fargo agreed a second time on keeping the evidence secret. It may be that Wells Fargo was not convinced that the February Secrecy Order went far enough to keep all of the evidence secret. For whatever reason, both sides again agreed on keeping evidence a secret, both sides presented another proposed secrecy order to the judge, and both sides asked the judge to sign this one, too. She did. Again without changing anything that was proposed to her.
The agreements and the secrecy orders are not available in the Court file. The author received copies only because the City Attorney's Office provided me with copies of the orders, which no-one can make sense of without having the stipulations too, since the orders did nothing more than approve the stipulations and make them the judge's rulings.
In fact, nothing in the Court file is available that was filed after August, 2015. It is a fact nonetheless that various documents were filed with the Court in that case from August, 2015 until the case was closed thirteen months later with a judgment agreed upon by the parties.[17]
We do not know what Wells Fargo said or how Wells Fargo answered the questions. Instead, first Wells Fargo asked for confidentiality of its answers and then the City Attorney stipulated to keep this evidence a secret.
The author could not access the motion on the Court's electronic docket, as noted. The City Attorney's Office sent me copies of the orders and stipulations, but they did not send me copies of Wells Fargo's motion or of Wells Fargo's answers to the special interrogatories, either. They believed that they could not make Wells's motion publicly available since it might be different from the copy that Wells filed in the Court file. This is certainly a pickle, to say the least. Needless to say, perhaps, but the L.A. City Attorney's Office also refused to make Wells Fargo's answers publicly available including to the author.
To be continued later this week with THE FINAL INSTALLMENT: BANK DEREGULATION GROWING MASSIVE "CROSS-SELLING CLAIMS."
Please Read The Disclaimer. ©2019 Dennis J. Wall. All Rights Reserved.
[1] See Michael Corkery, "DealBook / Wells Fargo Fined $185 Million for Fraudulently Opening Accounts" (New York Times Online posted September 8, 2016).
[2] Id.
[3] Id.
[4] "In May, 2015, following an extensive investigation precipitated by this [December, 2013] report in the Los Angeles Times, the Office of City Attorney Mike Feuer sued Wells Fargo over allegations of opening unauthorized accounts." Press Release by Mike Feuer, Los Angeles City Attorney, "Protecting Consumers" (undated), available online at http://www.lacityattorney.org/allegations-against-wells-fargo.
[5] There were a few scattered news reports that the OCC was investigating Wells Fargo, along with the Federal Reserve, another agency of the federal government. There was also rank speculation that if other federal agencies were investigating Wells Fargo, then the CFPB might also be investigating Wells Fargo. There were no details offered in any of these news reports. See, e.g., Dan Freed, "U.S. Regulators Probe Wells Fargo Sales Practices - WSJ" (Reuters Online, posted at www.reuters.com on Monday, November 30, 2015); Catherine Phillips, "Wells Fargo Faces Federal Investigation Over Sales Tactics" (posted in the "Northern Californian," posted on Tuesday, December 1, 2015 at www.northerncalifornian.com/local/california); "Wells Fargo's Sales Tactics Are Reportedly Under Investigation" (posted by Bay Area News Group online at www.bayareanewsgroup.com, on Tuesday, December 1, 2015).
[6] See the OCC's "Statement Regarding Revocation of Relief to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., from Certain Regulatory Consequences of Enforcement Actions," dated November 18, 2016, posted online at www.occ.gov/topics/laws-regulations/enforcement-actions/statement-wellsfargo-111816.pdf. This "Statement" was not easy to find and, to the author's knowledge, it will not be found anywhere else, other than online on the OCC's website.
[7] Consent Order signed September 4, 2016, filed September 8, 2016, in In re Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (United States of America Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Administrative Proceeding No. 2016-CFPB-0015, paragraph 16 on page 5. The Consent Order is available online at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/092016_cfpb_WFBconsentorder.pdf .
[8] Laura J. Keller, "Wells Fargo Warns it May Find More Clients Bilked" (Bloomberg News posted on March 2, 2017), quoting an unidentified Wells Fargo "annual regulatory filing."
[9] Stacey Cowley, "DealBook / Wells Fargo Review Finds 1.4 Million More Suspect Accounts" (New York Times Online, August 31, 2017). In addition, see, e.g., James Rufus Koren, "Wells Fargo May Have Created 1.4 Million More Unauthorized Accounts Than We Thought, Attorneys Say" (Los Angeles Times Online, May 12, 2017); Kartikay Mehrotra and Laura J. Keller, "Wells Fargo's Fake Accounts Grow to 3.5 Million in Suit" (Bloomberg.com, May 12, 2017); Brian Tayan, "The Wells Fargo Cross-Selling Scandal" (Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, posted on December 19, 2016), available at https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/12/19/the-wells-fargo-cross-selling-scandal.
[10] The author takes sole responsibility for the calculations in the text; they are his alone. The quote is from Cornell Law School Professor Robert Hockett, quoted by Michael Corkery, "DealBook / Wells Fargo Offers Regrets, But Doesn't Admit Misconduct" (New York Times Online, posted on September 9, 2016).
[11] [Proposed] Stipulated Final Judgment signed by the City Attorney and by Wells Fargo on September 1, 2016 in People v. Wells Fargo & Co., Case No. BC 580778 (Los Angeles County Superior Court), at ¶ 5 on page 3, & ¶ 49 on page 13.
[12] Stipulation and Consent to the Issuance of a Consent Order, filed on September 8, 2016 in In re Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (United States of America Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Administrative Proceeding No. 2016-CFPB-0015), ¶ 2, on page 2.
[13] September 6, 2016 Consent Order for a Civil Money Penalty in In re Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., OCC #2016-079, at 1; Stipulation and Consent to the Issuance of a Consent Order in OCC No. AA-EC-2016-66, signed by the Wells Fargo Board of Directors and dated September 1, 2016, but signed by the OCC on September 6, 2016, "Article II / Consent," ¶ (1) at p. 2.
[14] The Los Angeles County Superior Court's Online Docket shows the following entry for June 14, 2016:
06/14/2016 Stipulation and Order (REGARDING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO PRESERVE CONFIDENTIALITY DESIGNATION OF SPECIAL INTERROGATORY RESPONSES (FIRST SET)
Filed by Attorney for Plaintiff/Petitioner[.]
[15] Stipulation and Protective Order entered and filed on February 2, 2016 in People v. Wells Fargo & Co., Case No. BC 580778 (Los Angeles County Superior Court).
[16] Stipulation signed May 26, 2016 with Order entered on June 14, 2016, filed together on June 14, 2016 in the same case.
[17] See EMail from the Los Angeles City Attorney's Office to the author, Wednesday, March 1, 2017, on file with the author.
To be continued later this week with THE FINAL INSTALLMENT: BANK DEREGULATION GROWING MASSIVE "CROSS-SELLING CLAIMS."
Please Read The Disclaimer. ©2019 Dennis J. Wall. All Rights Reserved.