The evidence makes it clear that the Obama Administration is pursuing a three-part litigation strategy with respect to alleged fraud by executives and other officers of large corporations: (1) Suit will be filed against the corporation and only a few officers; and (2) the Federal Government will settle those suits, not prosecute them; and (3) in each case, the settlement will be paid by the shareholders for the corporation's share, while the defendant officers will pay comparatively far less. The end result is that the Obama Administration is executing the law at the expense of corporate shareholders and, perhaps for that reason, the amounts to be paid on behalf of the settling corporations are so small as to trigger judicial scrutiny.
The Securities and Exchange Commission has apparently taken the lead in executing this strategy, based on published reports. Earlier in the same week that this post is written, for example, a Federal Judge in the District of Columbia demanded answers to questions which include why Citigroup was made the target defendant and the Citigroup officers responsible for the corporate conduct in question were not also investigated, identified, and made defendants too. Newspapers have reported on this development without tying the strings of the Obama Administration litigation strategy together. See, e.g., William McQuillen, "Citigroup-SEC $75 Million Subprime Accord Held Up by U.S. Judge's Doubts" (Bloomberg.com, Tuesday, August 17, 2010); Zachary A. Goldfarb, "Judge Rejects Citigroup's Settlement With SEC" (Washington Post Online, Tuesday, August 17, 2010). The reporting is not the problem here; the problem is the lack of experience and capacity to put litigation and settlement strategies in context, to understand them, to recognize them as they begin to display a track record.
The current proposed settlement in Washington, D.C. is very like Federal Judge Jed Rakoff's reaction on Monday, September 14, 2009 in a ruling rejecting the SEC's proposed sweetheart deal with Bank of America to settle the fraud claims which the SEC filed against BOA in the Southern District of New York. The proposed settlement was denied because it was "neither fair, nor reasonable, nor adequate." The main reason that the proposed settlement was neither fair nor reasonable nor adequate in the eyes of the Federal Court, was that the corporate shareholders would bear the major burden of paying the settlement -- which the officers caused, not the shareholders, any more than the shareholders caused the conditions which caused the SEC to sue for fraud in the first place. "MORE and MORE: Bonuses Bonked, Fiduciary Concerns Stifle SEC Settlement!," Insurance Claims and Bad Faith Law Blog, September 14, 2009, quoting Download Securities and Exchange Commission v. Bank of America Corp. (S.D.N.Y. Opinion Filed September 14, 2009), attached Official Slipsheet Opinion at 3. When the settlement was changed, including a nearly 500% increase in the agreed fine to be paid by BOA, it was reluctantly approved. Download Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Bank of Am. (SDNY Case No. , Opinion Filed -02.22.10 Approving Settlement).
This is part of a pattern. The S.E.C. is justifiably earning its nickname of the "Settle Every Claim" SEC. Earlier this year, the SEC agreed with Goldman Sachs to settle its fraud claims for less than a week's worth of Goldman Sachs' profits. "'Settle Every Case' S.E.C. Settles Another One," Insurance Claims and Issues, August 4, 2010.
However, it is not just the Settle Every Claim SEC that is filing lawsuits against corporations, ignoring major and senior officers, and settling for proposed amounts that tax the shareholders far more than anything the officers might pay to settle a given case. On the day that this post is written, The New York Times reports that yet a third Federal Judge rejected a proposed Federal Government "'sweetheart deal'," to use the Judge's own term. This came in a criminal case filed by the Department of Justice against Barclay's Bank, it was reported. "Judge Denounces a Barclays Settlement" p. B2, col. 1 (New York Times Nat'l ed., Reuters Report, Wednesday, August 18, 2010).
The unfair consequences to corporate shareholders are clear. Under this equally clear litigation and settlement strategy, the innocent shareholders are made to pay for the deficiencies of the culpable. The consequences to Director's and Officer's Liability Insurance Companies and to Federal Taxpayers are clear too. To the extent that Federal prosecutorial agencies deliberately avoid investigating and charging officers with the consequences of their own conduct, the percentage chances of recovery for covered offenses under their D&O Coverage are drastically reduced. To the extent that the Government charges officers with offenses excluded from these D&O Insurance Policies, then to that extent the officers may have to bear their own expense, which after all, would in such cases be no more than the consequence of their own alleged conduct.
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