Suppose Secretary of Defense James Mattis was given an unlawful order? Other names for unlawful orders include "illegal orders" and "unjust orders". When I was growing up, the standard question was whether a German soldier who was given an unlawful order to round up people and put them into concentration camps and kill them should obey or if the German soldier stood on high moral ground by refusing to obey those unjust orders.
Nowadays the question is forward-looking, not backward-looking. The question is posed in modern times more immediately as well, such as orders to bomb Tehran in Iran, or to bomb with a missile strike launched against Pyongyang, North Korea? The question in these cases is really whether starting a so-called preventive war to eliminate a long-term future threat based on currently perceived, unchanged conditions would constitute an unlawful order?
To try to answer that question from an insurance coverage perspective, which is after all what we do here on this blog, let's first assume that the official is not immune from liability or suit.
Would insurance policies potentially cover following an illegal order like this?
To answer this insurance coverage question, let's move beyond the James Mattis of the title to this article. Let's move beyond him personally, even in a hypothetical case like this one, to any official or officer and ask the same question: Would insurance policies available to the official potentially cover the official for following an unlawful order such as bombing Tehran or Pyongyang based only on the current world situation?
Here are some issues that would arise under any insurance policy that may be available to the official who obeys an unjust order.
Is it "fortuitous" as affording "all risk" coverage? As I will explore more deeply in a forthcoming article, judges often say that there is a good reason to deny coverage for "all risks" if the event that causes damage was not "fortuitous."
By using this word, courts mean that it is not fortuitous on its face when the event that caused the damage claim was inherent in the thing itself, such as an opal which becomes cracked which is an apparently normal and usual event.
Judges in other courts and other cases, and even the same judges in the same cases, also use the word to mean that if the event that caused the damage was not due to an external cause but instead was due to an inherent defect in the thing itself rather than an external cause, such as where the insured brings it about by her or his own act. In such a case, they hold, there can be no insurance coverage.
Following an unjust order to begin an unprovoked unjust war can legitimately be held up as the opposite of fortuitous, and so uninsurable in any case.
Is it an accident causing damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured? Courts unfamiliar with first-party insurance concepts like "all risks" coverage often analogize the insurance requirement that a loss be "fortuitous," to the third-party requirement that the risk insured must be an "accident."
If third-party policies were available to the official who follows an order to nuke Tehran or Pyongyang right now, then just as the resulting damages can legitimately be held up as the opposite of fortuitous under an all-risks first-party policy, so the official's conduct should legitimately be held the opposite of a covered "accident" under a third-party policy.
Would the "war risk" exclusion apply? This is an interesting question. The war risk exclusion probably applies to damages from war. Arguably it should not apply to damages resulting from a decision to follow someone else's unlawful order even if following that order means war.
If this construction were followed in our hypothetical situation, the war risks exclusion probably would be held inapplicable to the official's decision to follow the unlawful order.
Public policy. This is not a path that most courts are happy to follow when considering insurance coverage questions. Courts generally shy decisively away from public policy questions in the context of passing on insurance coverage questions.
However, as can be seen from our brief discussion here of "fortuitous," the very nature of insurance coverage itself is involved in this particular question. When judges say that a risk or damage is "fortuitous" or not, they are really passing on whether the risk or damage was insurable in the first place.
Further, the Florida Supreme Court has held that intentional religious discrimination is something that cannot be insured as a matter of public policy. Ranger Ins. Co. v. Bal Harbour Club, Inc., 549 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 1989).
It is not much of a leap from that decision to also declare that the decision to bomb Tehran or Pyongyang under present conditions ought not to be insurable as a decision to follow an unlawful order.
Hopefully, these hypothetical questions will all remain only theoretical, as they are now.
Please Read The Disclaimer. ©2018 by Dennis J. Wall. All Rights Reserved.